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1 Introduction
There is increasing academic and journalistic inter-
est in the apparent breakdown of organized society
in much of Africa, in the context of prolonged
war. Some commentators have gone so far as to
identify a degenerative social disease in Africa that
threatens to infect the rest of the world - 'the
coming anarchy' (Kaplan 1994). While social dis-
location and the frustration and delinquency of
members of some social categories are important
phenomena, this is a travesty of the complex
power relations, economic and social structures,
and military doctrines that determine the nature
of contemporary warfare in Africa. Low technol-
ogy it may be, 'primitive' or 'anarchic' it is not. As
so often, such pejorative labels merely indicate
that the writer is incapable of analysing what is, in
reality, taking place.
lt is difficult to generalize about contemporary
African warfare. The highly-disciplined, highly-
motivated fighters of the Eritrean People's Libera-
tion Front (EPLF) are a stark contrast with child
soldiers who form many of the shock troops of
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). But
some generalizations are in order, and it is arguable
that the EPLF represents the exception, and the
NPFL the trend.
This article briefly seeks to place contemporary
forms of warfare in Africa in a historical context,
namely the end of the Cold War, coinciding with
protracted economic crisis.
The means whereby fighting forces are maintained
and supplied are essential to understanding how
wars are fought. Just as the economic crisis in
Africa has had profound consequences for rural
development and the provision of social services, it
has had a profound impact on military establish-
ments. Governments find it more difficult to sus-
tain and control armies, which then turn to local
sources of provisioning. These include requisition-
ing, looting and taxing local populations, involve-
ment in commerce, and diverting humanitarian
aid. Though the causes of wars in Africa and the
aims of the combatants are still almost exclusively
phrased in terms of achieving state power and
affecting constitutional change, the realities on the
ground reflect more intense predatory behaviour
by soldiers.
The structural transformation in the means of
mobilizing military forces is matched by new mili-
tary doctrines appropriate to such self-reliant, low
technology forces. Military commanders have
found doctrines of counter-insurgency warfare and
destabilization developed during the Cold War to
be highly effective. There is careful, deliberate strat-
egy behind much of what appears to be pathologi-
cal violence.
2 Re-assessing Cold War
Strategies
With hindsight, it is necessary to re-evaluate some
of the key components of Cold War conflict in
Africa. Superpower patrons competed for African
clients, and supported favoured governments mili-
tarily and economically, or alternatively backing the
guerrilla movements opposed to them. External
military and economic assistance facilitated the cre-
ation of top-heavy centralized states.
African states used a variety of means to suppress
insurrection, ranging along a spectrum between
two radically different approaches. One approach
centralized state military power in a massive, mono-
lithic army. The paradigm of this approach was
Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam. The con-
trasting approach was the deliberate fragmentation
of military structures, so as to diffuse any threat
to the government from within the military itself.
The paradigmatic case of this is Zaire under Mobutu
Sese Seko. This section will briefly contrast the two.
The former Ethiopian government used mass,
forcible conscription to create an army that at its
height was about 500,000 strong. Excepting the
Red Terror of 1977-8, conscription was arguably
the most unpopular of the government's policies,
especially among townspeople. Recruitment cam-
paigns, initially envisaged as yearly events, became
more and more frequent to the extent that by mid-
1988 it was a continual process. 'Everything to the
warfront' became the official slogan in 1988.
Quotas for recruits for neighbourhood associations
were replaced by violent press-ganging.
By 1990, Ethiopia had obtained an estimated
US$8 billion worth of military equipment from the
USSR, including over 1450 battle tanks and 120
combat aircraft (NOVIB 1991).
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The conscripts were then given a rudimentary mili-
tary training and sent to the front. They proved
unwilling and unreliable troops. After monumental
destruction and loss of life, the Ethiopian army was
not only defeated but destroyed. The largest army
in sub-Saharan Africa simply disintegrated between
February and May 1991 under the final onslaught
of the rebel fronts that now comprise the core of
the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Mengistu's defeat dramatizes the shortcomings of a
massive, centralized Soviet-style army Neither has
a similar strategy proved successful elsewhere, for
example in Angola. Even before 1991, the lessons
were being learned elsewhere.
In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko observed the vulnera-
bility of central government in a huge country to
military coup and regional insurrection. Three
decades after being plucked from obscurity to
impose order on the disintegrating state of the
ex-Belgian Congo, Mobutu is still there. He cannot
achieve any form of social or economic develop-
ment in Zaire, but he is in power.
Mobutu's strategy was to fragment the security ser-
vices and armed forces. The army has been run
down to a strength of merely 20,000 men, most of
whom are poorly equipped. In response to internal
threats, a succession of clandestine special strike
forces were formed, deployed and then dissolved.
The President presides over no fewer than six
specialized security services, including: (1) the
10,000-strong civil guard, (2) the Special
Presidential Division (DSP), (3) the Gendarmerie
Nationale, putatively a unit of the national army, (4)
a clandestine hit squad known popularly as 'Les
Hiboux', reportedly trained by the former South
African government, (5) the Service Nationale
d'Intelligence et de Protection (SNIP), the civilian
security force and (6), the Service d'Action et de
Renseignements Militaires (SARM), the military
intelligence force. These all report to the President
and are commanded by men hand-picked for loy-
alty In addition, Mobutu has regularly used foreign
mercenaries in defence of his position.
In the vast and dispersed regions of Zaire, military
commanders run what are in effect semi-
autonomous fiefdoms. Many of their troops are not
paid. Instead they engage in private commerce,
raise contributions at roadblocks, or loot and pil-
lage from the local population. Sexual violence
against women is common.
Mobutu has also run down the transport and com-
munications infrastructure of the country. At inde-
pendence, Zaire had 140,000 miles of paved road;
by the early 1970s, there were only 20,000 miles,
and since then the network has deteriorated further.
This also helps prevent the mobilization of military
opposition to his rule.
The success of Mobutu and the failure of Mengistu
in holding on to power holds lessons that many
African rulers have not been slow to absorb. This
coincides with structural pressures for more
devolved and fragmented forms of military mobi-
lization.
3 StructuraI Changes to Warfare
The era of powerful aid-supported centralized states
has come to an end. Many governments remain
strong; they can still command wealth, legitimacy
and arms, and in some cases the positions built
by their leaders during the Cold War seem to be
virtually unassailable. But the relationship between
governments and people has fundamentally
changed, as rulers can no longer seek unlimited
support from their foreign patrons.
This has not stopped the competition for state
power, but it has meant that governments can no
longer intervene with complete impunity in local
affairs. In the extreme case, the removal of govern-
ment can assist in building peace. The central
rangelands of Somalia are a case in point.
This region is overwhelmingly pastoral, and the
conflict of the 1980s was sparked in large part
by central government manipulation of local con-
flicts over resources such as grazing and trade
routes. While one clan could call upon paratroop-
ers to support its claims, resolution of the disputes
was impossible. The removal of the central gov-
ernment in 1991 has, while not necessarily restor-
ing an 'equilibrium', at least meant that the
problems and the means of resolution have been
matched. Clan elders are negotiating over clan
resources without fear of interference from a parti-
san government.
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The weakening of states has also led to a blurring of
the distinction between insurgency and counter-
insurgency. This difference was already becoming
less significant as more governments resorted to
various forms of military mobilization based on
paramilitaries. The chief remaining difference is air
power, but some African governments are now
without an effective air force.
The 'privatization' of national armies has become
commonplace: almost every army on the continent
is involved in business in one way or another. Even
the ferociously centralized former Ethiopian army
saw numerous officers selling arms and ammuni-
tion in the last years of the war. This privatization
is often (though not always) accompanied by frag-
mentation. This break-up is often not explicit - it
is only in centralized armies that there is a reason
to mutiny; in fragmented armies, an independent-
minded commander can do whatever he likes
without mutiny
Sudan: the militia strategy
The mobilization strategy adopted by successive
governments in Sudan during the 1980s is an
important case, showing how near-bankrupt states
can mobilize when faced with the threat of insur-
rection. The strategies adopted by both govern-
ment and rebels, working within a state in profound
crisis, led directly to a classic post-Cold War con-
flict. The hinge on which this transformation
turned was the 'militia strategy' - a means of waging
war opportunistically seized upon by President
Nimeiri and then developed by his successors.
The origins and development of the Sudanese civil
war have been detailed elsewhere and will not be
recounted here (Johnson and Prunier 1993). One
component, however, has been insufficiently
stressed, namely the promotion of the oilfield mili-
tias. This case is worth examining in some detail,
because it indicates how apparently uncontrolled
ethnic strife is a direct outcome of military and
political strategy
The 'Unity' oilfield, at Bentiu in Upper Nile, close to
the internal north-south frontier, promised a huge
econonhic windfall that would break Sudan's eco-
nomic decline. For some years before the acknowl-
edged outbreak of war in 1983, Bentiu area was
known as 'Beirut' because of the level of banditry
and cattle raiding. This reflected the failure of the
government to deliver on its promises of develop-
ment, and the deepening marginalization of the
pastoralists in the region. Discontent among
former Anyanya guerrillas from Sudan's first civil
war (1955-72), who had been absorbed into the
Sudanese army, led to many defections and minor
mutinies. In response to this local insecurity,
the oil company Chevron proposed hiring merce-
naries - reportedly from the Philippines. The gov-
ernment's counter-suggestion was to create a local
protection force.
A militia was formed from the Misiriya section of
the Baggara Arab pastoralists, who live just to the
north of the internal frontier. This marked the
beginning of the militarization of rural Sudan. The
Baggara militias, commonly known as Murahaliin
became the most active and most violent of the gov-
ernment forces for the first five years of the war.
Murahaliin fighters armed themselves for a mixture
of personal and communal motives, and the war
became inextricably entangled in a whole set of local
disputes between and within local communities.
The 'militia strategy' generated its own momentum
through militarization, the expansion of cattle raid-
ing, and the breakdown Of customary and govern-
mental mechanisms for resolving local inter-ethnic
disputes (de Waal 1993a). The drought and famine
of 1983-5 in northern Sudan drove destitute former
herders to seek to replenish their stocks through
raiding, and traders with squeezed profit margins
to turn to financing cattle raiding as a lucrative
business (de Waal 1993b, Keen 1994).
A complementary strategy followed by the govern-
ment was to buy off fragments of the southern
militias - all of whom called themselves Anyanya-2
- with money, weaponry and promises of political
rewards. At one time in 1984, Nimeiri was negoti-
ating with no fewer than six different armed south-
ern factions, all operating in the vicinity of the
oilfields. These negotiations meant that a range of
local concerns became central to the dynamics of
the conflict - the personal, commercial and ethnic
rivalries between the factions and their leaders. By
1984, a single, government-supported 'Anyanya 2'
existed. An exclusively ethnic Nuer force, it fuelled
Nuer-Dinka ethnic tension, helped portray the
9
SPLA as a 'Dinka army', and posed the main mili-
tary challenge to Garang for the first four years of
the war, until Anyanya 2 split in 1987.
The 'militia strategy' served Nimeiri's political
purposes well. In 1984 he canvassed the idea of
mass conscription but quickly realized that it
would lead to popular unrest in the main cities.
Nimeiri also distrusted the army (with good rea-
son, as it transpired) and was unwilling to entrust
more power to them. A major purge of the army
in early 1982 was followed by an outright bribe
to the remaining officers: the Military Economic
Board was set up, which transferred seventy
public sector companies to military control. In an
echo of Mobutu's policy, army officers could
now also run businesses, with considerable tax
breaks (de Waal 1993b). Commerce and war were
closely linked thereafter. Merchant-officer partner-
ships made fortunes through smuggling, dealing
in scarce commodities in garrison towns and
cattle raiding.
Avoiding mobilizing the army also had the advan-
tage that Nimeiri could pretend to his patrons and
creditors that Sudan was not really at war, but
merely beset with some localized ethnic problems.
Finally, the militia strategy was cheap. It only
required supplying small arms and ammunition -
and many of the militiamen had armed themselves
already in any case.
The subsequent history of the war has reinforced
the local impulses towards fragmentation, as exter-
nal sponsorship declined. Nimeiri was overthrown
in April 1985, but his successors intensified the
militia strategy, finally legalizing them in 1989.
Drought and famine intensified the economic
incentives for militia raiding. The parliamentary
government of Sadiq el Mandi also began to envis-
age the militias as a political counterweight to the
army
Military officers' attitudes to the militias are ambiva-
lent. In the first six years of war, the army relied on
the militias to do most of the fighting, so that the
army itself sustained very few casualties, but also
saw few military successes. The army also saw the
militias as a threat to its position. The military gov-
ernment of Lt-Gen Omer al Bashir, that seized
power in 1989, also began to recognize that the
militias were a danger. Some defected to the SPLA
and some refused to fight.
Senior military officers also believed that only the
army could decisively defeat the SPLA, if only they
were given full support by the politicians. This
belief was fostered by the military success of the
only two major conventional operations under-
taken in the South before 1989. The present gov-
ernment of Sudan has therefore tried to reverse the
trend towards fragmentation. Since 1990, the
Sudanese militia strategy has been to create a con-
script paramilitary force, the Mujahidiin, who are
raised in the name of Islamic extremism and who
fight under the command of the army. It remains to
be seen whether this novel and somewhat anom-
alous attempt at centralized mass mobilization
will succeed.
4 The Fragmentation of
Insurrection
The fragmentation of government military mobi-
lization has been matched by the increasing struc-
tural incoherence of insurrectionary groups.
During the Cold War, the centralization of power
and resources in the state in turn centralized the
struggle for power. While left-wing rebel move-
ments developed radical intellectual critiques of
the nature of state power, this was rarely translated
into a practical agenda for dismantling states
themselves. This was a cause of strain among rural
followers whose agendas were both more immedi-
ate and more radical - the removal of a state
presence.
In the independence struggle for Zimbabwe, the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) mobi-
lized large sections of the rural population in sup-
port of its guerrilla war. Most commentators have
supposed that this reflects an identity of aims and,
if only passingly, of interests between the guerrillas,
their leaders and the peasants. In fact, as Norma
Kriger has recently shown (Kriger 1992), rural peo-
ple had their own reasons for participating in the
war. Many participated through coercion. Those
who did so willingly were often pursuing local
agendas of social change, with the targets of their
grievances other local farmers, shopkeepers,
administrators; more powerful local lineages; or
their parents or husbands. While the ZANU
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leadership claimed that the promotion of women's
rights was a fundamental tenet of their struggle,
the reality on the ground was somewhat different.
There was a vast gap between the token women
who represented the front abroad and the experi-
ence of women in the villages and the fighting units.
Violent resistance is particularly common among
pastoralists. Government policies that render illegal
or unviable the livelihoods of whole sections of the
community invite criminality as a response, both as
a means of securing an alternative income and as a
protest against forms of authority that radically
transgress customary rights.
Pastoralists tend to make fierce fighters. However,
the acephalous nature of many pastoral societies
makes it difficult for them to sustain centralized
insurrectionary armies. Pastoral nomadism implies
a wide territorial spread, with authority for decision
making devolved down to local units such as lin-
eages. Much of this decision making involves
diplomatic contact with neighbouring communities
- a practice that has to be reversed if a central mili-
tary authority is to be imposed. Rebel armies based
among pastoralists therefore manifest considerable
strain between these contrary impulses.
Almost all the African rebel movements that
endured during the Cold War did so with external
support. External sponsorship led to centralized
control of supplies of arms, ammunition, food,
intelligence, security and propaganda in insurgent
movements. This led to a characteristic three-zone
structure. A base area, either in a remote comer of
the country or in a neighbouring country, provided
a secure zone for training, resupply and the activi-
ties of internal intelligence. The base area might
include refugee or displaced camps that were fed by
the international community, enabling the rebel
commanders to divert substantial amounts of food
'at source.' Beyond the base, there was a consoli-
dated area, in which a recognizably normal eco-
nomic life prevailed, with the rebel movement
providing some administration and services in
return for raising taxes and obtaining recruits.
Beyond that, an operations area was contested with
the government forces.
For insurgents too, the decline in external sponsor-
ship is weakening military hierarchies. Without a
centralized supply or arms, provisions, propaganda
and other necessities, the main impulses towards
centralization are lost.
The Sudan People's Liberation
Army
Sudan is, once again, a dramatic example of how
constraints on mobilization have dramatically
affected the nature of insurrection (African Rights
1993). From its inception in 1983 until May 1991,
the SPLA relied upon Ethiopian sponsorship and
Ethiopian bases to unify the movement. During
this time, the SPLA had a three-zone structure. Its
base area was in the Gambella region of Ethiopia.
Adjacent to this, inside Sudan, was a slowly-
expanding consolidated area. The remainder of
southern Sudan was a contested operations area.
In contrast to Maoist doctrine, the SPLA only built
up the most basic reciprocal relations with the local
population. The best SPLA commanders were akin
to paternalistic colonial administrators; the worst
were predators.
Immediately after the fall of Mengistu and the loss
of external support, the SPLA began to fragment.
Just four months later, in August 1991, two senior
commanders, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, split
away and formed the 'SPLA-United' faction.
Though the commanders' dissent was based upon
issues of iñtemal democracy, the division rapidly
took on ethnic lines, recreating the Nuer-Dinka
split of the early days of the war.
The three zone structure collapsed. Unable to
divert food and fuel 'at source' in the base area, the
SPLA commanders sought to obtain it from relief
operations at the point of delivery. Riek's ability to
command independent relief supplies to their head-
quarters, through Operation Lifeline Sudan, under-
pinned his initial breakaway. Maintaining a flow of
relief thus became a strategic imperative. When the
relief is inadequate or unreliable, the worst preda-
tory tendencies manifest themselves. Many units
sustain themselves through looting and cattle raid-
ing, a reflection of the SPLAs failure to build up an
internal economic base. Where commercial oppor-
tunities, such as smuggling coffee or logs, are avail-
able, they are exploited too.
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The structure of the humanitarian programme in
southern Sudan, with direct delivery (usually by
air) to numerous locations, has helped determine
the structure of political-military authority within
the southern movement. Commanders are im-
pelled to retain concentrations of hungry people
to attract international relief.
Since 1991, the SPLA has continued to split. Riek
Machar and Lam Akol have divided, their difference
taking on a Nuer-Shilluk ethnic divide; and other
SPLAUnited commanders have gone their separate




Throughout Africa, an important component of
commanders' independence is their ability to con-
trol local commerce. The integration of commerce
and violence in government armies has been
matched by similar processes in rebel movements
and militias.
In Liberia, Charles Taylor can finance his forces
through commercial logging. In Angola, ivory
smuggling and diamond digging lie at the centre
UNITAs military strategy. In Somalia, control over
the trade in the narcotic leaf qat has been an
essential component of General Aidid's ability to
maintain his militia.
An investigation of the role of ethnicity in contem-
porary armed conflict is beyond the scope of this
article. But the salience of ethnic identification
cannot be ignored, and it is quite possibly sharpen-
ing. With the devolution of military authority
down to the level of local commanders, comes the
identification of individual military units with their
particular locales. Ethnicity is characteristically
used by authoritarian rulers to divide and rule their
subjects. Having been thus used, it readily takes on
a life of its own, and becomes a means of local
mobilization of armed forces.
In practice, the war aims of more and more insur-
gents and militias are more and more local and
specific. Sustaining and enriching themselves, and
securing supplies of ammunition, fuel and food
have become the overriding preoccupation of some
groups. However, this is rarely explicit. Most still
avow political programmes that hark back to an
earlier era of nationalism. Sudanese factional lead-
ers who control merely a tiny area and whose alle-
giance seems to be available at the price of a
truckfull of ammunition still speak about the need
to separate religion and the state, and the difference
between regional autonomy, confederation and
self-determination. In Somalia, leaders of local
factions appear to be gripped by a nostalgia for a
form of stable nation-statism that they have never
had. Just as anti-colonial peasant revolts wanted to
resurrect a moral order that had almost certainly
never existed except in a (false) folk memory; it
seems that a longing for a remote and receding form
of ideal sovereign government is informing many
African fighters.
The reality that the old days of aid-supported cen-
tralized states has gone has yet to be fully recog-
nized; there is still the anticipation in many places
that capture of a state will bring the same set of
powers and privileges that Cold War rulers enjoyed
by virtue of superpower patronage. The French
government has played a central role in this. Under
successive presidents, France has been the most
active super-power in Africa. Mitterand's personal
links with many Francophone African leaders, and
his belief that France's position in the world
depends upon a prominent role in Africa, led to
France giving disproportionate support to its
African friends.
5 New Military Doctrines
In Africa today, despite the apparent chaos of
irregular warfare, military doctrine is evolving
rapidly One reason for this is simply that the
continent has seen continuous warfare for the last
three decades, so that commanders have tremen-
dous field experience, and have improvized.
Innovations can be seen in the adaptation of mili-
tary technologies - for example the EPLF fitted
captured Soviet-made tanks with new gearboxes
so that they could operate more effectively in
mountainous terrain. There is also a more wide-
spread and insidious set of innovations, the devel-
opment of new methods of combat, recruitment
and use of social and psychological methods of
destabilization. There is enough that is new, and
enough that is the novel recombination of familiar
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elements, to warrant the description, a 'new doc-
trine' of warfare.
Contemporary African military theory cannot be
found in manuals. It is not written down, partly
because it is deliberately secret and untraceable,
and partly because it is not imparted through for-
mal military academies. Some of the leading prac-
tical theoreticians of new forms warfare are well
known (Yoweri Museveni, Jonas Savimbi, Charles
Taylor), others are anonymous.
Contemporary military discourse in Africa can
trace its ancestry to many sources both inside and
outside the continent. There are still-vibrant
indigenous traditions of warfare, some of which
are passed on in initiation ceremonies and secret
societies, particularly in west Africa. As part of
their initiation into these societies, young men are
taught specific military practices which may have
originated centuries ago. The methods of initiation
and the means whereby discipline is maintained
among the members of secret societies may have
important parallels in military recruitment and
organization - parallels that are necessarily obscure
to outsiders.
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that con-
temporary African warfare is essentially a resur-
gence of old practices. The key influence on the
military discourse has been insurgency and
counter-insurgency doctrine, developed in Europe,
America, the former Communist bloc and the for-
mer racist regimes in southern Africa. These doc-
trines have been rigorously tested in the field and
refined through experience.
The legacy of Maoist theories of 'people's war'
remains significant in Africa. A whole generation of
guerrilla fighters was schooled in Maoist practice
and its Cuban variant. Socialist ideology and
Maoist practice were, for the most part, intimately
linked. Soldiers fight for partly for ideology and
ideology is in turn central to effective discipline.
During the Cold War, the principal exponents of
Maoist variants of guerrilla warfare were to be
found in Eritrea, Tigray and southern Africa. These
struggles centred on making appeals to peasant
grievances and linking the conduct of the war to
programmes of social and economic reform, such
as land reform, literacy and female emancipation.
Recruitment to the ranks of the fighting forces was
achieved through political mobilization. Relations
with the peasantry in the liberated areas were
characterized by reciprocity; the people fed and
sheltered the guerrillas, and provided them with
intelligence, in return for protection and a political
programme that furthered their social and eco-
nomic aims. Women were encouraged to join, in
rhetoric at least on an equal basis. Mao's dictum
that once the support of the masses is forfeited, the
revolution is lost, was adhered to - or at least, it was
not explicitly rejected.
in all of these cases, the analyses of the insurrec-
tions have largely been the work of those who sym-
pathized with the revolutionary cause, and who
relied on the accounts of members of the guerrilla
elite and other sympathizers for their material. Itis
therefore unsurprising that adherence to the Maoist
doctrines have been stressed. lt is now becoming
more acceptable and common to recognize the
coercion and abuse that were also common in these
wars. The failures with regard to women's rights
have been particularly significant. The discrepancy
between the aims of the fighters and the local peo-
pie is also becoming more evident, a discrepancy
sometimes fuelled by considerable social, economic
and ethnic distance between the groups. But, espe-
cially in the cases where the fronts controlled large
areas of territory for periods of time, there is no
doubt that a significant component of the ideologi-
cal commitment was genuine, and that the fronts
really did rely on popular support, in part obtained
through bringing material benefits to the people. In
the case of ZANU, where the front did not succeed
in controlling territory such that it could deliver
tangible benefits, this case is weakest.
This tradition has remained alive, developing its
own indigenous variants. The Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) adapted the doctrines its
founders learned from the EPLF, arguably to greater
effect. Frelimo's strategy was the basis for the
National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, which
in turn informed the Rwandese Patriotic Front in
Rwanda. UNITA amalgamated Maoist methods
with right wing destabilization doctrines and land
mine warfare.
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New discoveries in counter-
insurgency strategy
Parallel to Maoist doctrines of 'peoples' war', a
counter-tradition of right-wing counter-insurgency
terrorism and destabilization was developed during
the Cold War. This, an invisible component of the
super-power struggle, is key to understanding
what has been happening in African military strat-
egy since.
The roots of counter-insurgency practice, in British,
French, South African, American and Soviet doc-
trine, are difficult to trace, but some commonalities
are evident. A key component is that the people
themselves are the target. Colonel Roger Trinquier,
who advised the French army in Algeria, wrote:
'The inhabitant in his home is the centre of the
conflict ... Like it or not, the two camps are com-
pelled to make him participate in the conflict; in a
certain sense, he has become a combatant too'
(Trinquier 1964: 29).
There are many components of new military doc-
trines that cannot be discussed here, including the
systematic use of rape, the deployment of anti-per-
sonnel land mines and the creation of counter-
insurgency famine. Methods used to create and
enforce discipline, in the form of military 'initiation'
and brutalization, are a particularly rich field for
examining the fusion of indigenous tradition and
modern specialist practice, but will also not be
discussed here. This section will concentrate on
two of the most important innovations: the theory
of destabilization and terror, and the use of
children.
Destabilization is a logical development from British
and French counter-insurgency strategies, as im-
provized by Rhodesian and South African military
intelligence. The Rhodesian Central Intelligence
Organization used 'pseudo-terrorists' who commit-
ted brutalities with the intention of discrediting
nationalist guerrillas and sowing fear and confusion
among the rural populace. This practice rapidly
grew into 'counter-terrorists' - special irregular
forces sent to infiltrate and attack guerrilla bases in
neighbouring countries. Renamo in Mozambique
was the leading exponent of this. Under South
African guidance, sponsorship of Renamo grew into
a strategy of destabilization aimed at all the neigh-
bouring independent states - a strategy not aimed
at seizing state power, but destroying or humbling
states.
A second transmission route for destabilization
methods is from Afghanistan. Volunteers from
across the Islamic world, including the Moslem-
dominated countries of north Africa, joined the
international brigades of the Afghan Mujahidiin.
They were trained by US Special Forces in irregular
warfare including destabilization, and also learned
techniques developed by the Iranians and the
Lebanese. Since the Soviet withdrawal, there has
been a diaspora of these veterans to their countries
of origin. Colloquially known as 'Afghanis', they
are responsible for much of the violence in the
Mediterranean littoral countries.
A key element in destabilization is the creation of
ethnic discord. Military intellectuals have discov-
ered that it only takes a few individuals to destabi-
lize a large community. The would-be destabilizer
needs only to engage in a few acts of violence
against one ethnic or sectarian group (chosen arbi-
trarily) in order to create a climate of mistrust, and
turn a community against itself. Random violence
as a deliberate strategy then replicates itself as intra-
communal violence, which can then spread and
intensify with minimal effort by the instigator.
A second component is conspicuous atrocity. The
essence of terrorism is spectacle. To achieve his
aim, the terrorist or practitioner of destabilization
must not only commit acts of violence, but do them
in a conspicuous manner. Renamo is a paradig-
matic case. The seemingly mindless violence by
Renamo soldiers has a number of causes, some
material, some symbolic and psychological.
Looting for economic reward is a part explanation.
The systematic vandalism of economic and social
infrastructure can be seen partly as an explosion of
rage against the symbols of modernity - a modernity
that under the Portuguese and the independent
government had provided almost nothing to the
people except a deep sense of hurt - but is also to
be found in a deliberate policy of 'conspicuous
destruction'. This was the annihilation of all sym-
bols of the opposing order, as an element in psy-
chological warfare. The graphic mutilation of
captives was another aspect of exemplary terror.
The captives were then released so that they would
make their way back home, their horrific injuries
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on display The purpose is to undermine the citi-
zen's sense of security in short, to destabilize.
Renamo's acts of exemplary terror were fewer than
the macabre stories in the press might suggest. But
they served their purpose. Graphic mutilation was
commonest when Renamo was at its weakest; in its
early days, in strongly pro-Frelimo areas, and after
it had suffered military reverses.
Charles Taylor has developed the use of exemplary
terror in Liberia. His chief refinement has been in
the methods of advertisement, not the types of
atrocity On several occasions he promised a 'carni-
val of blood' and used the fear of his troops to great
military advantage. Reversing the normal military
doctrine that surprise is the key to success, more
than once he has announced over the BBC World
Service his intention to attack a certain town, caus-
ing the people to flee in panic. Taylor's rival, Prince
Johnson also showed a keen appreciation of the
effectiveness of conspicuous atrocity when he tor-
tured and executed President Samuel Doe, and
ensured that a video recording of the gruesome act
was made. Copies of the cassette were widely cir-
culated in west Africa and served Johnson's purpose
well - they proved that Charles Taylor was not the
victor in the Liberian civil war.
Children
One of the most characteristic facets of contempo-
rary wars in Africa is that many of them are fought
by young people including children. This is a
wholly new phenomenon which promises to
change radically the nature of warfare, with pro-
found consequences for the ability to resolve con-
flicts and demilitarize the continent.
Few African societies have any tradition of child
soldiers: fighting was the task chiefly or exclusively
for young adult males. Children and youths did
play a role in military mobilization in some soci-
eties, but rarely in the front line. It is the availabil-
ity of cheap, light, easy to use automatic weapons
that has made child combat a possibility
One component of child soldiery is the recruitment
of under-age boys to armies that are desperately
short of manpower. This was for instance the case
in Ethiopia and is common in southern Sudan.
Armies simply take younger and younger conscripts
because the supply of able-bodied young men of
the right age is drying up. This is common in pro-
longed wars and is not the main phenomenon
under consideration.
More significant is the deliberate recruitment of
children to serve as combat soldiers. This phenom-
enon has received some attention from human
rights organizations and psychologists; its wider
social and military significance is our concern here.
The best known child armies are in Mozambique
and Liberia, but 3,000 children under sixteen
(including 500 girls) also fought with the NRA in
Uganda in the mid-1980s and they are increasingly
common throughout the continent, notably in
Angola.
Child soldiers are preferred by many commanders
for several reasons. African children are usually
brought up to be obedient, and child soldiers can
therefore be highly disciplined. They are also mal-
leable; they lack inhibitions and a sense of propor-
tion, and so can be persuaded to carry out acts of
extreme violence. They have no responsibilities at
home that may inhibit their commitment to fight-
ing. When bored, they are less prone to contem-
plate desertion and a return to a civilian life. Child
soldiers are particularly terrifying when manning
roadblocks because they combine total, arbitrary
power with a lack of judgement - they may shoot
people for trivial reasons, or follow instructions to
the letter without any readiness to compromise.
Children are used by some forces to execute pris-
oners, a task that adult soldiers do not like.
Children are not merely used to fill the ranks of
regular units; there are special units of children in
some forces. These units are commanded by chil-
dren who have been awarded with ranks (report-
edly up to 'general' in the case of the Charles
Taylor's Liberian forces) on the basis of their effec-
tiveness in combat.
The use of children has a major effect on military
strategy. Children do not understand conventional
military strategy and tend to treat war as a street
game. Professional soldiers are frightened of fight-
ing children because the children do not know
when to stop, nor when they are in an untenable
military position and should withdraw. In any
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engagement that approaches a conventional battle,
child soldiers will simply be massacred, but in an
irregular or surprise attack they can be devastating.
Hence children are sometimes put in the vanguard.
Child soldiers are cheap. They do not need to be
well paid, and need relatively little training. Many
Liberian child soldiers are paid in drugs, especially
cocaine and marijuana.
Perhaps the most significant fact about child sol-
diers is the ease with which they can be recruited,
especially from communities already disrupted by
war. While a substantial minority of child soldiers
have been forcibly recruited and brutalized, most
are volunteers (Goodwill-Gill and Cohn 1994: 30-
43). They seek out a military life from a sense of
adventure, having been socialized into violence
from an early age, or because they are looking for
some stability and a sense of order in a disrupted
life. There can also be intense social pressures for
them to participate, both from adults and from their
peers. Many orphans become camp followers to
guerrilla forces and militias because they have no
home to go to, and because they want to avenge the
deaths of their parents. Commanders then progres-
sively assign them to guard, checkpoint and ulti-
mately combat duties. Children can also be
recruited from communities where adults are
unwilling to join up, perhaps because the adults
know the likely consequences of warfare. The ease
of mobilizing children is a genuine and ominous
discovery in the development of military doctrine.
6 Conclusion
The pervasive militarization of society is one of the
dominant features of contemporary Africa. The
immediate roots of this lie in the legacy of the Cold
War - including the supply of armaments, training
in their use, and authoritarian forms of rule that
cannot be sustained in the absence of super-power
patronage. Such an inheritance is a guarantee of
armed conflict, at least until new political dispensa-
tions are worked out. The decay of state structures
provides both opportunity and encouragement for
the use of violence to commercial ends. Meanwhile
the supply needs of military forces can make them
susceptible to loyalty on the basis of material sup-
port alone. The formal armies of nation states are
being replaced by more diverse military formations,
with members who fight for a range of motives
other than patriotism and discipline.
Other aspects of the Cold War have bequeathed a
more insidious and perhaps more durable legacy
One of these is the success of minimalist state
strategies (exemplified by Mobutu in Zaire) that
deliberately fragment governmental authority in
order to preserve an individual in power. Another
includes new doctrines of destabilization and
counter-insurgency, easy and cheap to use and very
difficult to contain. They include conspicuous
atrocity, the use nf children in combat and the
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